ABSTRACTIn this paper, I intend to reconstruct the main points of Taylor’s politics of recognition, starting from the debate about negative and positive liberties. Then, I will focus on the role of the ideal of authenticity in this conception of freedom, as well as on the dialogical conception of the self. Furthermore, I will develop the political consequences of these ideas. In addition to examining McBride's argument about the oppressive character of recognition, I will also address Fraser's objection concerning the (...) sectarian character of Taylor's theory. Furthermore, I also consider Ikäheimo's criticisms in respect to the problem of integration between the horizontal and vertical forms of recognition, the issue of affirmative action, and the idea of a passive subjectivity. Finally, I will centre on Axel Honneth's criticisms to Taylor's idea of recognition in terms of its lack of clarity. (shrink)

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En este trabajo intento mostrar que existen diferencias importantes entre las concepciones del Estado de Hermann Cohen y de Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Por lo tanto, concluyo que la tesis de la influencia de la filosofía fichteana en la teoría de Cohen es problemática. In this paper I try to show that there are important differences between Hermann Cohen's and Johann Gottlieb Fichte's conceptions of the state. Therefore I conclude that the thesis of the influence of the Fichtean philosophy upon Cohen's (...) theory is problematic. (shrink)

In this paper I try to show that Heidegger develops in Being and Time an ethics of the authenticity, which doesn´t consist in the prescription of rules of action, but in a certain attitude, which the Dasein has to adopt toward his own mortality. In relation to this aim I will consider the problems of the state of Verfallenheit, the anxiety and the death as an own possibility. These themes are analyzed from the point of view of the dichotomy that (...) Heidegger establishes between the authentic existence and the unauthentic existence. (shrink)

The Fichtean theory of self-consciousness and recognition, published in 1796 and 1797, must be understood in terms of the mutual formation of subjects insofar as they are rational and free beings. It is for this reason that this paper criticizes Stephen Darwall´s interpretation from the second person´s perspective. It also reconstructs the Fichtean theory of family, suggesting evidence of the relationships of recognition that structure it. In this way there are analogies between the original situation of summons and the formative (...) relationships at the core of the family community. (shrink)

Knauss, Stefan. Von der Conquista zur Responsibility while Protecting. Die Debatte zur humanitär gerechtfertigten Kriegsführung aus lateinamerikanischer Perspektive. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Edition, 2016. 274 pp.

En este trabajo intento mostrar, contra la tesis de D. James, que existe una relación de continuidad entre la teoría del derecho internacional del Fundamento del derecho natural y de El Estado comercial cerrado de Johann G. Fichte, basándome en dos razones. En primer lugar, en ambos textos la propiedad de los ciudadanos puede ser garantizada sólo si el Estado es soberano en relación con los demás para planificar su propia política económica. En segundo lugar, si bien en El Estado (...) comercial cerrado se restringen las relaciones comerciales entre los ciudadanos, también quedan abiertos otros tipos de relación entre los ciudadanos de diferentes Estados. (A). (shrink)

En este trabajo se discute la interpretación de Isaiah Berlin de la filosofía política fichteana en términos de un organicismo. Esta interpretación muestra que las libertades individuales juegan un rol fundamental en la educación de los ciudadanos futuros en tanto que ésta es una tarea realizada por los padres y no por el Estado. Sin embargo, Fichte no defiende una idea de la libertad individual como no-interferencia, aun cuando las similitudes entre su teoría y la de Humboldt sugieran lo contrario. (...) Del mismo modo, Fichte no defendió tampoco la idea de la libertad como no-dominación, como revela la comparación con la teoría de Philip Pettit. Por el contrario, Fichte sostuvo que la educación de los futuros ciudadanos tiene sentido únicamente cuando las libertades individuales son consideradas como inextricablemente unidas con la propiedad. This paper discusses Isaiah Berlin’s interpretation of Fichtean political philosophy in terms of organicism. It shows that individual liberties play a fundamental role in the education of future citizens as a task performed by parents, not the state. However, Fichte did not defend an idea of individual liberty or non-interference, even if similarities between his theory and Humboldt’s suggest the contrary. At the same time, Fichte also did not espouse the idea of freedom as non-domination, as a comparison with Philip Pettit’s theory reveals. By contrast, Fichte posited that the education of future citizens makes sense only if individual liberties are considered inextricably linked to property. (shrink)

In this paper I try to reconstruct the arguments developed by Fichte in his work Foundations of Natural Right (1796/1797), in order to support the necessity of a recognition of capabilites and rights by the other, so that the I can constitute itself as a self-consciousness. I also take into account the criticisms the Fichtean theory has received by many contemporary interpreters, testing its consistency in the light of these arguments.

The philosophy of history of 1804 and 1805 enables Fichte to place his natural right, developed previously at Jena, against a diachronic background. This means that Fichte does not reason merely synchronically from a timeless conception of society and state. From a synchronic viewpoint, Fichte cannot solve the problem of the control of political power because he has to draw on the assumption of a virtuous ephorate. This assumption is not consistent with the Fichtean ideal of a philosophy of right (...) completely independent from moral considerations. Thus, the control of government is possible only if at least a group of citizens can go beyond the mere rational egoism. This new temporal conception of the state leads Fichte to think that the problems of consistency of his theory of Jena are unavoidable, given that a society integrated by egoist individuals cannot be sustained. However, his later philosophy of history enables Fichte to state the inexorable annihilation of this type of community and gives place to an ensuing epoch, when citizens are not self-interested anymore. (shrink)

This paper aims to explore conceptual relationships between philosophical developments to support freedom of speech in John Milton´s Areopagitica and Johann Gottlieb Fichte´s Reclamation of the Freedom of Thought. I intend to enhance the philosophical heritance collected and recreated by Fichte. This paper hypothesizes that both theories state that freedom of speech is a condition for the development of morality. In both cases, moral deliberation has a public character, given that moral judgment needs the consideration of different viewpoints about the (...) question at stake. Finally, in both cases, it is defended a republican concept of power, characterized by opposition to moral paternalism, as a form of despotism. (shrink)

Este volumen colectivo, editado por Nuria Sánchez Madrid, Paula Satne y Larry Krasnoff, constituye un aporte sustancial al estudio de la filosofía kantiana del derecho. Dadas las limitaciones de espacio, podré detenerme brevemente únicamente en algunas de las contribuciones que enriquecen el volumen, si bien todas son muy valiosas y originales.

"The Fitchean Project of a Penal Right Independent from Ethics". in this paper I intend to examine the Fitchean Project of building a theory of right independent from ethics, especially in the sphere of penal right. I consider that the ideas of atonement for pure and applied right are different. This difference responds to the psychological and moral presuppositions of each and puts the internal consistency of the theory into checkmate.

En este trabajo intento reconstruir la argumentación desarrollada por Fichte en su obra Fundamento del derecho natural, de 1796/1797, en orden a fundamentar la necesidad de un reconocimiento de capacidades y de derechos por parte del otro, para que el yo pueda constituirse como autoconciencia. También considero las críticas que ha recibido la teoría fichteana por parte de diferentes intérpretes contemporáneos, testeando la consistencia de la misma a la luz de estas argumentaciones.

El rol de la intersubjetividad en la constitución de la autoconciencia -- La estructura de la relación legal -- La teoría del Estado -- El rol de la corporalidad del individuo en a fundamentación del sistema legal -- El derecho a la existencia.

Para Hegel, Asia señala el comienzo de la historia universal, mientras que Europa señala su consumación y final. La América precolombina, al igual que la África negra, están para Hegel fuera de la historia universal; en cuanto a la historia de América tras su descubrimiento por los europeos, Hegel sostiene que lo que ha sucedido desde entonces en el continente americano proviene, en rigor, del “principio de Europa”. Hegel contrapone a su vez la historia de América Latina a la de (...) los actuales Estados Unidos en términos del respectivo desarrollo económico y social. Hegel atribuye la brecha de desarrollo entre las dos Américas, por un lado, a que América Latina es católica y Estados Unidos es mayoritariamente protestante, y, por el otro, a que América Latina fue “conquistada”, mientras que Estados Unidos fue “colonizado”. Sobre la base del análisis de los textos pertinentes de la obra de Hegel, se reconstruirá su teoría sobre el desigual nivel de desarrollo socio-económico de América Latina y Estados Unidos y se evaluará la plausibilidad, actualidad y eventual deficiencia de la misma. (shrink)

Una exposición de las particularidades de la propuesta hermenéutica del autor vascoaragonés Andrés Ortiz-Osés. En ella se trata de poner de relieve los aspectos de mayor relevancia para una lectura política de esta temática. Se maneja una selección de obras del autor y bibliografía secundaria realizada con ánimo interpretativo más que taxonómico. Las conclusiones alientan a profundizar en esta lectura, que resulta novedosa con respecto a los enfoques exclusivamente hermenéuticos o antropológico-culturales.

Professor Judea Pearl won the 2011 Turing Award "for fundamental contributions to artificial intelligence through the development of a calculus for probabilistic and causal reasoning." This book contains the original articles that led to the award, as well as other seminal works, divided into four parts: heuristic search, probabilistic reasoning, causality, first period (1988-2001), and causality, recent period (2002-2020). Each of these parts starts with an introduction written by Judea Pearl. The volume also contains original, contributed articles by leading researchers (...) that analyze, extend, or assess the influence of Pearl's work in different fields: from AI, Machine Learning, and Statistics to Cognitive Science, Philosophy, and the Social Sciences. The first part of the volume includes a biography, a transcript of his Turing Award Lecture, two interviews, and a selected bibliography annotated by him. (shrink)

This is the first comprehensive discussion of all the main philosophical issues raised by terrorism against the background of its past and recent developments. Prominent philosophers discuss definitions of terrorism, approaches to its moral evaluation, and the contentious subject of state terrorism. Also included are four case studies, showing how the concepts and arguments philosophers deploy in discussing violence, war and terrorism apply to particular instances of both insurgent and state terrorism, ranging from World War II to September 11, 2001.

Any plausible position in the ethics of war and political violence in general will include the requirement of protection of civilians (non-combatants, common citizens) against lethal violence. This requirement is particularly prominent, and particularly strong, in just war theory. Some adherents of the theory see civilian immunity as absolute, not to be overridden in any circumstances whatsoever. Others allow that it may be overridden, but only in extremis. The latter position has been advanced by Michael Walzer under the heading of (...) “supreme emergency.” In this paper, I look into some of the issues of interpretation and application of Walzer’s “supreme emergency” view and some of the criticisms that have been levelled against it. I argue that Walzer’s view is vague and unacceptable as it stands, but that the alternatives proposed by critics such as Brian Orend, C.A.J. Coady, and Stephen Nathanson are also unattractive. I go on to construct a position that is structurally similar to Walzer’s, but more specific and much less permissive, which I term the “moral disaster” view. According to this view, deliberate killing of civilians is almost absolutely wrong. (shrink)

Abstract: According to Hegel, comprehension proper is the ostensible self-determination of thinking with the determinations that spontaneously present themselves as independent objects. By positing objective determinations as the own determinations of thought, comprehension reveals thinking as an activity that is practical. For Hegel, comprehending allegedly extrinsic objects, and free willing of the own determinations of the thinking and willing subject, are in essence the same activity: only subjects who can choose between the determinations that determine them can comprehend objects. To (...) elucidate: only subjects who are able to actively determine themselves with the determinations that spontaneously determine them are able to analyse and comprehend the objects of their knowing activity. Thought that can think itself defines, according to Hegel, the true nature of the human spirit. (shrink)

El objetivo del presente trabajo es poner de manifiesto las dificultades que implica desde su origen mismo la estructura argumentativa adoptada en este respecto por Tomás y, ulteriormente, mostrar que dicha estructura contiene el germen de su propia disolución, así como tendencialmente también el de la disolución de la metafísica teológica como disciplina filosófica.

There is no empirical research exploring how substance abuse therapists perceive and manage their professional role or privacy boundaries. This study explores their attitudes associated with self-disclosure and dual relationships. Ten therapists, five who had recovered and five who had never been substance dependent, shared their work experiences during semi-structured, in-depth interviews, which have been subjected to interpretative phenomenological analysis. While nonneophytes were generally reluctant to share personal information or establish alternative forms of relationship with current or former clients, neophytes (...) were more open to using self-disclosure and admitted changing professional relationships into friendships. These findings are discussed in relation to ethical codes, training and supervision in substance abuse treatment. (shrink)

This article addresses the role of auditory-related verbs in the work of Jean-Luc Nancy and Pierre Schaeffer in order to shed light on a broader tendency in French thought. Through a comparative reading of the ways in which Nancy, in Listening, and Schaeffer, in Treatise on Musical Objects, mobilize verbs such as écouter and entendre, I connect the issue of language to debates about descriptive and prescriptive approaches towards listening. Drawing on the Dictionary of Untranslatables, I argue that Nancy's and (...) Schaeffer's engagements with listening can be mapped onto historical modes of framing politics and ethics, which are also characterized by descriptive and prescriptive approaches. By showing how theories of listening connect to political and ethical debates, this study discusses the ideological instrumentalization of listening as opposed to more descriptive and exploratory forms of engagement in the auditory and the faculty of the ear. (shrink)

La presente investigación tiene como propósito general asumir un posicionamiento filosófico en clave histórico-social y de tipo anti-relativista para analizar el desarrollo histórico de la matemática, el cual aplicaremos a un caso en particular: la matemática del antiguo Egipto. Para ello se discutirán y criticarán, en primera instancia, determinadas posiciones filosóficas afines al cuasi-empirismo en matemática que, siendo relativistas, permitirán delinear nuestro propio posicionamiento en contraste: la existencia de una «matemática situada». Esta categoría filosófica tendrá como sustento teórico la noción (...) de conocimiento situado. Además, las implicaciones de esta son, según sostenemos, tanto filosóficas como historiográficas, ya que servirá para analizar las características del corpus de problemas matemáticos egipcios registrados en los diversos papiros matemáticos. En particular, haremos referencia a las expresiones lingüísticas egipcias para denotar las diversas operaciones aritméticas y el carácter algorítmico de los problemas, así como también la cuestión epistemológica de la empiria y cómo la perspectiva situada permite superar la dicotomía entre una matemática pura y otra aplicada, que consideramos no es ubicua para abordar la interpretación de la práctica matemática del antiguo país del Nilo. Palabras clave: Filosofía de la matemática, Anti-relativismo, Matemática situada, Extrañeza del pasado, Matemática egipcia. (shrink)

Metaphysics relies on the presupposition of the non-being of the world: since the world has once not existed it is necessary to postulate a cause for its existence, i.e. an extrinsic principle to explain the absolute beginning of the causal series of all things that constitute the world. After the critique of theologizing metaphysics by authors like Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche, the notion of an absolute beginning still persists though in a field in which it often goes as such unnoticed, (...) while it factually enjoys wide acceptance, namely in epistemology. It sounds as a truism that knowledge begins: personal inexistence (birth-death cycle) and the phenomenon of unconsciousness (sleep-wake cycle) seem to endorse the obviousness of that statement. Now, to link the beginning of the phenomenal series of subjective acts of knowledge with the existence of an external world that causes the specific content of our temporary cognitive acts relies, however, on two presuppositions, namely on the thesis of a complete non-being or nothingness of knowledge and, intrinsically related to this first presupposition, on the thesis of an absolute beginning of cognitive activity. If knowledge begins from its own nothingness, there must be a cause that is external to the totality of acts of knowledge, a cause that it doesn´t belong to the series of cognitive acts and, therefore, that it is not caused by any of them: this uncaused cause of contentful knowledge is supposed to be the real world external to the knowing subject. In my paper I make explicit the relation between realist-empiricist approachs to epistemology and the double presupposition of the nothingness and absolute beginning of knowledge, I explain the difficulties implied by these two presuppositions and, finally, I propose as a plausible solution to those difficulties some key theoretical claims of absolute idealism. (shrink)

Adorno asocia la concepción hegeliana del espíritu a la concepción en última instancia formal de la subjetividad de Kant y del Fichte de la Grundlage. La subjetividad no puede ser infinita: al sujeto siempre se le opone el objeto. Aunque pretende superar el subjetivismo de la concepción kantiana y fichteana del sujeto, la unidad del sujeto y el objeto que define al "espíritu" de Hegel es todavía un sujeto; fuera de este sujeto resiste siempre algo no-idéntico que le es irreductible; (...) un idealismo absoluto es como tal, pues, imposible. En una línea con esto, Adorno considera que la Lógica hegeliana carece de contenido y permanece, a pesar de sus pretensiones materiales, una teoría puramente formal. Ahora bien, Adorno no ofrece un análisis detallado de la argumentación de Hegel en contra de la concepción formal de la subjetividad que proponen Kant y el primer Fichte. Hegel diferencia la subjetividad vacía obtenida por abstracción a partir del sujeto empírico respecto de la subjetividad absoluta o espíritu. Adorno rastrea la esencia del idealismo absoluto en la relación entre sensibilidad e inteligibilidad; para Hegel, sin embargo, la clave del idealismo absoluto reside en la unidad entre ser y pensar, o, lo que para Hegel es en última instancia lo mismo, entre ser y determinidad. (shrink)

Die Vernunft ist für Hegel die Einheit des Subjekts und des Objekts ? anders ausgedrückt: Subjekt zu sein impliziert, die Welt zu erkennen. Die Inhalte, die die Erkenntnistätigkeit spontan findet, »setzen« ihre eigene Erkenntnis nicht, weil die der Erkenntnis gegebenen Inhalte keine »unverursachten Ursachen« oder »unbewegten Beweger« des Erkennens sind. Die Erkenntnisobjekte sind für Hegel sowohl ruhend als auch in Bewegung: Unmittelbarkeit und Vermittlung sind bloße Standpunkte über die Erkenntnistätigkeit. Sich ein absolutes Nichtsein des Erkennens vorzustellen (z.B. durch die Zustimmung (...) zum cartesischen Gedankenexperiment, durch eine philosophische Deutung des psychologischen Phänomens des Unbewusstseins oder durch eine naturalistische Interpretation der Theorie der transzendentalen Subjektivität), verändert grundsätzlich unser Verständnis des Erkenntnisphänomens, weil es das Bedürfnis nach speziellen Gründungsakten erzeugt, die als absolute Ursachen der Erkenntnis fungieren sollen. Anhand von Spinozas Substanzbegriff hält Hegel dagegen das Erkennen für streng genommen unverursacht und insofern die Erkenntnisakte für innere Momente des unendlichen absoluten Elements des Erkennens, d.h. der ununterbrochenen und ununterbrechbaren Geist-Welt-Einheit. Vom Standpunkt des künstlich vorgestellten Nichtseins der Geist-Welt-Einheit muss aber der Kreislauf der Erkenntnisakte irgendwann angefangen haben; das menschliche Erkennen bzw. Denken wird dadurch zum bloß formalen Denken - in Hegels Terminologie: zum »Bewusstsein«. Damit die Tatsache begreiflich wird, dass das Erkennen schon immer einen Inhalt hat, müssen die Bestimmungen einiger Denkakte als Dinge interpretiert werden, die von außen her das Erkennen in Gang setzen und erfüllen. Erst diese hypostasierten Denkakte können die Tatsache erklären, dass der menschliche Geist die Wirklichkeit erkennt; im Gegensatz zu diesen Denkakten, denen das epistemische Privileg verliehen wird, den Geist mit der Welt in Kontakt zu bringen, werden die restlichen Denkakte zu bloß subjektiven Vorstellungen reduziert. In diesem Zusammenhang soll die sinnliche Wahrnehmung oder Empfindung den absoluten Anfang des Erkennens bilden, obwohl sie selber ein Akt und Moment des Denkens ist. Die empirische Erkenntnis soll hier ein in sich leer gewordenes Denken in Kontakt mit der Welt setzen, damit dieses erst dann zum Erkennen dessen wird, was es wirklich gibt. Für Hegel bilden dagegen die empirischen Gegenstände keinen absoluten Anfang der Erkenntnis, sondern sind bereits da im Denken als unendlicher Totalität des erkennenden Geistes und der erkannten Welt. In diesem theoretischen Rahmen gibt es - selbstverständlich! - Raum für sinnliches Erkennen, aber keinen für Empirismus. Aristoteles? Aussage, dass »die Seele in gewisser Weise alle Dinge« ist, und das scholastische Diktum, dass »ens et verum convertuntur«, paraphrasierend, behauptet Hegel: »das Absolute ist der Geist«. (shrink)